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Blockchain technology is firmly established in the public awareness as a revolutionary 
new technology underpinning cryptocurrency. However, its potential applications 
can be found across sectors and industries in providing a novel way of producing 
coordination necessary to transact online, making it a timely invention in the age of 
progressing digitalization and increasing demands for efficiency and security of online 
transactions, and a promising research topic addressing the growing academic 
interest in the coordination aspect of the contract scholarship. The aim of this 
conceptual paper is to model blockchain as a coordination mechanism for online 
transactions. Three key aspects of coordination with blockchains are identified and 
examined – (1) producing consensus about the facts relevant to a transaction, (2) 
coding contracts, and (3) autonomously executing transactions. They are argued to 
be integral parts of the mechanism, jointly enabling blockchains to function as a 
complete mechanism of coordination for online transactions. The model is intended 
to inform debates on the prospects for the blockchain technology and can be further 
used to integrate coordination and contract scholarship. 
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Introduction 
Coordination is prevalent in the business world, as it is required whenever various tasks 
must be employed together to produce desirable outcomes (Malone et al., 1990). This 
also concerns carrying out transactions, as they involve two or more parties who need 
to interact for the transaction to take place. However, as transactions differ in their 
coordination needs and associated costs, they call forth various mechanisms of 
coordination (and their combinations). Blockchain technology, extolled as the most 
significant technological breakthrough since the diffusion of the internet in 1990s 
(Tapscott et al., 2016), provides a novel approach and a new mechanism of 
coordination for transactions. Albeit associated primarily with cryptocurrencies, 
blockchain technology should be viewed more broadly as a foundational technology 
that has the potential to dramatically reduce the cost of transactions (Iansiti et al., 
2017). It specifically addresses and revolutionizes one key aspect of coordination, 
namely producing consensus about facts relevant to the transaction (“the state of the 
world”), and integrates this capacity with the contract coding and transaction 
execution aspects of coordination. Thus, blockchain technology operates and 
coordinates at the ontological as well as the activity level.  
 The aim of this paper is to model blockchain as a coordination mechanism for 
online transactions. The topic of coordination has appeared regularly in the 
blockchain literature – it has been conceived in terms of aligning blockchain 
participants’ incentives (i.e. as a precondition of good governance) (e.g. Davidson et 
al., 2018; Piazza, 2017) and related contexts, e.g. participants’ behavior related to 
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Symptomatically, references to coordination have been limited to the consensus 
protocols, i.e. providing consensus about facts, while other aspects of coordination 
have not been recognized. 
 In the present paper we take a broader view and consider consensus protocol as 
but one component of a composed mechanism of coordination formed by 
blockchains. In doing so, we depart from the dominant governance (transaction cost 
economics – TCE) perspective on blockchains and recognize that transaction 
characteristics (i.e. asset specificity, transaction frequency and uncertainty) are not 
the only determinants of how transactions are coordinated, as the TCE stipulates. 
Rather, as suggested by Schepker et al., (2014), transactions differ also along other 
dimensions. Specifically, these authors point at the purpose transactions serve, which 
is not only safeguarding against economic risk (as the TCE would have it), but also 
coordination and adaptation. 
 The present paper proposes yet another perspective on transactions, beyond their 
external purpose, namely how they are coordinated (i.e. internal focus). We posit that 
any transaction must be internally coordinated. Given space limitations, we focus 
more on substantiating the need for and indicating the place of the new approach 
to studying blockchains among the established perspectives than on detailing how 
individual components of the new coordination mechanism of blockchain are 
designed and work.  
 
The concept of coordination and its application to the 
production of transactions 
Although the term coordination is widely used and intuitively understood, it evokes a 
variety of domain-specific definitions, making it meaning highly contextualized. In 
management science, coordination had historically been considered one of the five 
key functions of management, together with planning, organizing, commanding and 
controlling (Fayol, 1917). More recently, management scholars defined it as the 
organization of individuals' efforts toward achieving common and explicitly 
recognized goals (Blau et al., 1962), the integration or linking together of different parts 
of an organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks (Van de Ven et al., 1976), 
bringing into a relationship otherwise separate activities or events, typically with the 
goal of increasing efficiency (Frances et al., 1991), and managing dependencies 
among activities (Malone et al., 1994; 2012). 
 The managerial definitions of coordination revolve around two components – 
organization of separate tasks or activities and orientation at achieving an overall, 
common or mutually beneficial goal (Pietrewicz, 2019). It follows that tasks must be 
performed in such a way as to help achieve the goal, making their performance 
interdependent (Malone et al., 1990), which takes the form of one task or activity 
being controlled or contingent upon performance of another (Victor et al., 1987). 
Organizational responses to interdependencies take the form of coordination 
mechanisms (e.g. Malone et al., 1990; 2012; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976), 

















Selected Coordination Mechanism Categorizations  
 
Framework author(s)  Coordination mechanisms 
Thompson (1967)  • Standardization of tasks 
• Plan  
• Mutual adjustment 
Van de Ven et al. (1976) • Impersonal (plans and rules) 
• Personal (vertical supervision)  
• Group (formal and informal meetings) 
Mintzberg (1979) • Mutual adjustment,  
• Direct supervision 
• Standardization (of work processes, outputs, norms 
and skills) 
Espinosa et al. (2004) • Explicit (task programming and communicating)  
• Implicit (cognition-based on shared knowledge) 
Fugate et al. (2006) • Price 
• Non-price  
• Flow coordination 
Malone et al. (2012) • Budgets, market-like bidding 
• Notification, sequencing, tracking 
• Standardization, ask users, participatory design 
• Scheduling, synchronization 
• Goal selection, task decomposition 
Source: partially based on Pietrewicz (2019) 
 
 We posit that the concept of coordination (and thus coordination mechanism) can 
be applied to transactions. As coordination literature concerns primarily value-adding 
activities along the value chains (both within firms and in interactions between firms), 
applying its conceptual apparatus to transactions requires that transactions be 
modeled as end products that must be produced, similarly to goods or services, using 
sets of discrete value-adding tasks (or activities) which must be coordinated in order 
to deliver a desirable outcome. Thus, production of transactions can be studied with 
the same conceptual apparatus as any other kind of business activity, deflecting from 
TCE and, more generally, incomplete contracts theory. To be sure, we do not call for 
discarding such established perspectives, rather, we argue for complementing them 
with a new approach.  
 
Coordinating with blockchains 
Coordination in computer science 
Advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have long been 
known to reduce coordination costs (Malone et al., 1987) by shifting constraints on 
certain types of communication and coordination (Malone et al., 2012). At the same 
time, computer systems have faced their own coordination problems, inviting 
research on coordination games, a branch of game theory.   
 In computer science, coordination mechanisms generalize scheduling (task 
allocation) policies for computer workload with the goal of improving the overall 
system performance (e.g. Christodoulou et al., 2009; Immorlica et al., 2009), and are 
used particularly in the context of decentralized coordination of self-interested 
agents’ jobs in so-called congestion games (Ackermann et al., 2009; Rosenthal, 1973). 
In essence, coordination mechanism is a decentralized algorithm (Christodoulou et al. 
2009), or – given a variety of task environments – a family of algorithms based on 
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i.e. dependencies that occur between tasks, and related uncertainties (Decker et al., 
1994). Many computer science researchers have found that there is no single best 
coordination mechanism (scheduling policy) for all task environments (e.g. Decker et 
al., 1994; Durfee et al., 1991), in line with the findings of the general coordination 
literature. 
 
Blockchains as coordination mechanisms 
Blockchain is a set of technologies developed around the concept of distributed 
ledgers. The term refers to a chain of blocks of information stored on a decentralized 
network of computers which verifies and records every transaction in a shared, 
encrypted ledger. Each new block of information is verified using a consensus 
protocol and linked to the one preceding it, thus forming a chain. Once created, the 
block (i.e. the information contained within) cannot be changed, giving blockchain 
the quality of immutability. The use of consensus protocols replaces intermediaries 
providing contract fulfillment services with a peer-to-peer clearing system, where 
anything of value can be transacted online (Pietrewicz, 2018).  
 Blockchain is widely recognized in the academic literature to provide a new way 
of coordinating economic activity by producing consensus about the state of the 
world, verifying authenticity of transactions in a novel way, and thus providing 
governance structure for blockchain-based applications (e.g. Davidson et al., 2016; 
2018; Piazza, 2017). Although this alone justifies categorizing blockchains as 
coordination mechanisms, the topic of coordination in blockchains should not be 
limited to their consensus protocols.  
 To make the view of coordination in blockchain-based transactions more 
complete, consensus protocols should be considered together with other aspects of 
the transaction processes (i.e. the production of transactions) requiring coordination. 
For a transaction to take place, a contract must be signed, its conditions fulfilled, and 
transaction successfully executed, creating a situation of interdependency requiring 
some sort of coordinated actions. 
 Contracts in themselves are coordination mechanisms (Schepker et al. 2014). 
Blockchain technology enables so-called smart contracts to be recorded on a given 
blockchain (ledger), enabling autonomous execution of transactions when conditions 
stipulated in the contract are met (Iansiti et al., 2017). Thus, smart contracts effectively 
integrate (and autonomously coordinate) recognition of conditions fulfillment and 
contract execution aspects of transaction coordination. 
 Smart contracts are computer programs encoded on a blockchain which trigger 
an automatic execution of contracts once conditions detailed on the contract are 
recognized as met. Since smart contracts are of binary nature, the encoded 
conditions must be very precise, leaving no room for interpretation and contestation 
(Pietrewicz, 2018). As smart contracts are programmable, they can cover a variety of 
contracts and multiple provisions detailing parties’ obligations in various possible states 
of the world. If a state of the world is not provided for, the transaction will not be 
executed, and the interested parties have no obligations to each other, as they 
agreed on using a specific smart contract beforehand. 
 
Discussion 
Transacting requires coordination. Coordination can be achieved using multiple 
coordination mechanisms or, as the present study suggests, a composite mechanism 
of coordination. Traditionally, part of coordination needed for interfirm transactions 
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transactions. Blockchain technology enables doing away with trusted third parties, 
replacing such institutions with algorithms. Coordinating transactions with algorithms, 
i.e. algorithmic coordination, automates the interactions between parties to a 
transaction by establishing “objective” set of rules encoded on a blockchain protocol. 
Blockchain automates consensus mechanism, i.e. the process of producing consensus 
about facts necessary for transacting (state of the ledger), thus replacing 
intermediaries; it also implements business rules in the form of so-called smart 
contracts. Smart contracts, recorded on a blockchain, detail contract conditions 
triggering transactions; once conditions are met, transactions are executed on the 
blockchain automatically and autonomously, without the need for human 
involvement. Although consensus protocols and smart contracts play different 
functions, they complement each other in giving blockchain a potential to 
revolutionize transactions. 
 The present contribution presents a simplified model of blockchain as a 
coordination mechanism for online transactions. More detailed take on the topic is 
certainly needed, extending the model and confronting it with both traditional 
coordination mechanisms and established approaches to coordinating online 
transactions. 
 The present study raises a number of research questions including the relation 
between smart contracts and law, subjectivity of algorithms, completeness of smart 
contracts, data privacy and security, transaction pricing models, standardization of 
data and systems and, more generally, the limits of algorithmic coordination.  
 Arguably the most theoretically promising research question, with obvious 
implications for the advancement of the blockchain technology, is the nature of the 
relation between the purpose of a transaction and its coordination mechanism. 
Schepker et al. (2014) identify and describe three such purposes: safeguarding against 
economic risks, coordination, and adaptation. Further studies should determine to 
what extent the choice of transaction coordination mechanism(s) reflects the purpose 
a transaction serves, and to what extent the transaction coordination mechanisms 




Blockchains blend together several technologies to establish coordination necessary 
for transacting online. Consensus protocols and smart contracts jointly coordinate the 
“production of transactions” in its three aspects: coding contracts on the blockchain, 
providing consensus on the facts relevant to transactions, and actually executing 
transactions, making blockchain a composite mechanism of coordination. Thus, 
blockchain goes beyond its basic functions of a digital ledger replacing the 
established double-accounting technique, and the “internet of value” (Tapscott et 
al., 2016), i.e. a technology for transferring digital assets online, to provide a composite 
algorithm-based mechanism for coordinating transactions online. It gives blockchains 
the potential to revolutionize transactions. Whether the potential will be realized, 
depends on successfully dealing with a number of issues, including the relation 
between smart contracts and law, subjectivity of algorithms, completeness of smart 
contracts, data privacy and security, transaction pricing models, standardization of 
data and systems, and the limits of algorithmic coordination. All these issues merit 
increased academic attention. Further studies should also address the nature of the 
relation between the purpose of transactions and their coordination mechanisms, 
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